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Performance measurement in a Transitional Economy: Unfolding a case of KPIs 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The paper aims to make contributions to the debate on ‘performance measurement 
in practice’ focusing on how organisational participants respond to the “new regime” of KPIs 
and whether KPIs materialise as intended in a transitional economy. 
Design/methodology/approach –Inspired by the epistemological instruction of Schatzki’s 
practice theory, this paper draws on qualitative data collected through face-to-face interviews, 
observations and documentary analysis of a single organisation.  
Findings – KPIs were introduced at PK (a manufacturing concern in Czech Republic) but 
widely seen as contradictory, inconsequential, top-down and unrealistic. These lead 
organisational participants to adopt a pragmatic approach toward PM embracing KPIs’ 
subjective assessment and manipulation, common sense or doing the job as given, and 
superficial compliance (symbolism). 
Research implications – The paper would be interesting to researchers because of its 
explanation of performance measurement practice in a distinct empirical setting, for its 
application of a practice theory inspired by Schatzki, and for inspiring new research agendas 
in transitional economies.  
Originality/value – The paper has focused on “organisations of practice” to unravel the 
“doings” of organisational participants to explore the micro-processes of PM which otherwise 
would have been ignored. These ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’, linked by pools of understanding, rules 
or instructions, and a teleoaffective structure, enabled us to unmask inherent tensions and 
contradictions in a new regime of performance measures such as KPIs. 
Practical Implications – The paper recommends the mobilisation of artefacts, such as various 
forms of bottom-up discussions, to encourage interactions between organisational members 
and influence individual beliefs and practical understandings of the intended managerial 
projects. 
 
Keywords: Performance Measurement, Practice Theory, Management Accounting, 
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Performance Measurement in a Transitional Economy: Unfolding a case of KPIs 
1. Introduction 
During the last three decades or so, business context has changed significantly especially 
in transitional economies1. Companies in transitional economies have been often driven to the 
adoption of contemporary management accounting tools in order to replace the centralised and 
uniform accounting models of the communist regime (Albu and Albu, 2012). This is not 
surprising given transnational accounting bodies and donor agencies, along with accounting 
and consultancy firms, have been selling the ‘best accounting models’ to transitional and 
emerging economies (Schiavo-Campo, 2009). We aim to study one of these ‘adopted’ 
contemporary management accounting tools and reactions of organisational participants to it 
in a transitional economy context. In particular, we focus on new performance measurement 
based on key performance indicators (KPIs) that adopted in a former cooperative society in the 
Czech Republic. We seek to ask the following questions: How do organisational participants 
respond/make sense of the “new regime” of KPIs? Does the new performance measurement 
model based on KPIs materialise as intended?  
The performance measurement literature encompasses debates around identifying 
workable performance measurement tools and demonstrating how they lead to improved 
performance (Grafton et al., 2010). Some studies document what does and does not work in 
performance measurement models (Christ et al., 2016), and several posit a fairly substantive 
role of micro-processes and interactions in shaping performance measurement practices, 
implementations and changes (Munir et al., 2013). However, these studies pay relatively scant 
attention to examining practitioners’ “lived experience” and how they make sense of 
performance measurement practices in a transitional/post-communist context. This is 
especially important when participants have gone through revolutionary changes in 
organisational and wider settings such as privatisation and market reforms. We believe that 
giving due consideration to participants’ practical understanding will enable us to unmask 
inherent tensions and contradictions in new regime of performance measurement such as KPIs, 
making a crucial contribution to debate on ‘performance measurement in practice’. 
Why do we take our empirical illustrations from a transitional economy? First, the case 
(anonymised as PK) is a firm that was transformed from a disabled people’s cooperative 
founded during the communist period into concentrated private ownership. Privatised firms in 
transitional economies have attracted little discussion in the performance measurement 
literature to date. The performance measurement practices of privatised firms, contextualised 
in non-western settings, often tend to be dismissed as lacking global relevance, whilst the 
opposite is true in the highly integrated globalised market economy, as they make a significant 
contribution to global GDP (Family Firm Institute, 2017). This paper fills this empirical void. 
Second, the transformation from state to market capitalism has also brought in new 
management philosophies. Paladi and Fenies (2016) argue that new discourses, such as 
efficiency and performance, have produced considerable challenges and interest for both 
researchers and practitioners. Moreover, the race to merge with European counterparts, with a 
view to attracting foreign investors, has driven countries to adopt EU directives as quickly as 
possible, with unanticipated consequences (Appel and Orenstein, 2018). 
Third, our case of a firm in the Czech Republic is of interest to the theoretical agenda of 
the performance measurement practice literature owing to the firm’s concentration of power in 
 
1 Transitional economies are referred to former Soviet Bloc countries. All of these countries have undergone 
some form of market reforms at varying degrees. Some are now included in EU who had managed to converge 
quickly to Western European countries.  
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a few individuals. It may also be of interest to wider audience from varied contexts to learn 
about the diffusion of an important performance measurement mechanism and its implications 
for practice in diverse settings. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on performance 
measurement practices and establishes the context of our research. Practice theory and its 
pertinence to the study of performance measurement are briefly sketched in Section 3. Details 
of our research methodology are given in Section 4, followed by a presentation of the empirical 
findings in Section 5. Empirical and theoretical insights provided by the theory are discussed 
in Section 6. Section 7 discusses some theoretical implications, with concluding remarks in 
Section 8. 
2. Performance Measurement Research and Transitional Settings 
Understanding organisational participants’ responses to new performance measures is an 
important theme to explore (Wouters and Wilderom, 2008; Groen et al., 2012; Carter and 
Tinker, 2006). Carter and Tinker (2006) argued that the implementation of a new performance 
measurement framework such as KPIs is greatly influenced by the diverse interests of 
organisational participants owing to evolving social and political contexts. Following this, 
several studies turn away from focusing purely on functionality to examine social, political and 
organisational aspects of performance measurement (Munir et al., 2013; Li and Tang, 2009; 
Henri, 2006). Some studies have examined tensions in performance measures, such as 
reconciling creativity and performance dimensions (Giovannoni et al., 2013), relational drifting 
(Andon et al., 2007), resistance (Modell, 2003), and messy interpretations of organisational 
actors (Sandhu et al., 2008).  
Despite the large number of studies on performance measurement, few focused on how 
participants’ responses shape performance measurement practices. Researchers have identified 
organisational factors such as control models, CEO’s education and local of control that shape 
performance measures (Tuomela, 2005; Haas and Speckbacher, 2017). Woods (2012) reveals 
evidence of supervisors changing performance indicators when they have doubts about 
objective measures. However, studies have paid little attention to how organisational actors 
make sense (the “lived experience”) of performance measures once established – how they 
develop a practical understanding of how they are being measured. This may have a significant 
bearing on how performance measurement is practised. This is particularly relevant when 
organisational members face overwhelming changes in organisational direction and 
philosophy, for instance as a result of ownership changes.  
Studies of performance measurement especially in transitional economies is relatively 
scarce and often without solid theoretical foundations (Khan, 2016; Alawattage et al., 2017a). 
Most of these studies have been conducted in public sector (O’Connor et al., 2006; van Helden 
and Uddin, 2016) and sceptical about implementing contemporary management accounting 
citing reasons such as lack of accounting infrastructure, under developed capital and labour 
markets, unsuitable legal and professional bodies, high level of corruption and informality 
(Tsamenyi et al., 2017; Alawattage et al., 2017b). Some studies demonstrated how new 
management accounting technologies clashes with varying traditional, cultural and political 
contexts and led to various unintended consequences (Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Hopper et al., 
2009; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Ashraf and Uddin, 2015). In contrast, several 
studies found evidence of the adoption of contemporary management accounting tool such as 
Balanced Scorecard in the private sector (Upadhaya et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, rarely studies intensively examined how new regime of performance 
measurement models such as KPIs fare in a transitional economy context. Few studies that 
exist argue that new market pressures, coupled with technological changes and the presence of 
foreign ownership, demand market-oriented management accounting system, including 
4 
strategic and advanced performance measurement and a change from a formal and hierarchical 
to a flexible and market-oriented structure in transitional economies (Cadez and Guilding, 
2007, 2008; Vámosi, 2000; Haldma & Lääts, 2002). Some studies in transitional economies, 
though uncritical in nature, found the companies are protrusive to showcase the application of 
contemporary management accounting tools (Albu & Albu, 2012). We believe simple transfers 
of accounting technologies rooted in developed/capitalist economies to countries such as 
transitional economies (post-communist countries) need further scrutiny. This is also important 
because studies found the strong presence of communist legacies in management accounting 
practices (Moilanen, 2007). However, lack of studies to critically evaluate the micro-processes 
of ‘adopted’ contemporary management accounting technologies is notable. Thus, we focus on 
‘lived experience’ of organisational members facing new regime of KPIs in a transitional 
economy to fill this gap. 
Micro-processes of performance measurement have been theorised, drawing on 
institutional theories (Munir et al., 2013; Modell, 2001, 2003) and structuration theory (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2002), to focus on institutional factors in changing performance measurement 
practices and accountability processes. Andon et.al. (2007) and Arnabolidi and Azzone (2010) 
draw on actor network theory to identify the transformational nature of performance 
measurement packages arising out of key actors’ vested interests. Building on this, we focus 
on the “organisation of practice” itself, seeking thereby to unravel the “doings” of 
organisational participants in changing settings (the socio-material context). We believe this 
will be useful in revealing what it makes sense for people to do in the context of changed rules 
and acceptable ends (normativity). Relying on the practice theory of Theodore Schatzki (1996, 
2001, 2005), we wish to develop a practical understanding of new performance measurement 
model based on KPIs and build up an understanding of diffusion of best management 
accounting practice in transitional settings. In the next section, we outline Schatzki’s practice 
theory and consider what it has to offer for research on performance measurement practice. 
 
3. Practice Theory Approach 
Since the 1980s, contemporary social theory has taken a “practice turn” (Bourdieu, 1990; 
Giddens, 1991). Schatzki (1996, p. 89) articulated practice as a “temporally unfolding and 
spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings”. People’s actions are organised by organising 
factors that form the so-called “organisation of practice”. The most important aspect of 
practice, according to Schatzki, is the “doing” or actual activity, or what he referred to as “the 
energisation”. The “doing” of practice is central to human existence. Doing performance 
measurement practices, for example, will consist of measuring performance, using 
performance indicators as sanctions or incentives, prioritising one performance indicator over 
others and ignoring some measurements. Practice comprises pedagogical knowledge as a basis 
for understanding, standards for evaluating employees, and organisational objectives that need 
to be achieved, relating to both soft and hard skills. These elements act as the organisation of 
performance measurement practice, or “integrative practice” in Schatzki’s terms. For Schatzki 
(1996), an integrative practice such as performance measurement is an organised set of actions 
(or sayings and doings) linked by pools of understanding pertaining to action, a collection of 
rules or instructions that regulate them, and a teleoaffective structure that orients them. 
Practice theory approaches human agency through its embeddedness in practices. Agency 
is not the starting point for inquiry in practice analysis, because practices as entities logically 
precede actors. Grasping the practical intelligibility of a practice is crucial for practice 
researchers. Schatzki calls practical intelligibility the “state of affairs” that makes sense of what 
someone will do. The focus here is on linkages that make practice cohere as an entity: practical 
understandings, rules and teleoaffective structures that remain in the background yet are 
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essential to defining what the practice is about and producing normativity (Schatzki, 1996, p. 
89). 
One essential element of practice is “practical understandings”, defined as “knowing 
how”. “Knowing how” is knowing which of the doings and sayings of which one is capable 
constitute the action in particular circumstances (Schatzki, 1996, p. 78). In addition, two or 
more people are considered to have the same understanding of a certain action when the doings 
and sayings performed by one person are considered by the others as intelligibly the same 
action. In other words, participants in a practice will have the same understanding of a 
particular action when they share the same knowledge and intelligibility of the doings and 
sayings relating to the action. Practical intelligibility – how a specific action makes sense to an 
actor – does not mean that actors necessarily act rationally or in a normatively correct way 
(Schatzki, 1996, p. 118), nor do all activities always result from actors’ explicit reflections on 
what to do. Practical understanding is thus theorised as a tacit and routinised aspect of practice. 
In order to articulate performance measurement practices, we seek to establish how 
organisational participants (employees) make sense of performance indicators and their uses, 
and what they do in reproducing the same practices.  
In relation to rules, which are the second element of practice organisation, Schatzki (1996) 
explains that rules, principles, instructions and the like are formulations when one is 
participating in the practice. They provide specific guidelines on particular actions. Rules guide 
actions, in terms of particular actions in specific situations, as well as enjoined actions. For us, 
the calculative aspects of performance measurement are the rules. 
Teleoaffective structure is also an important element of practice. Teleoaffectivity is a 
mixture of teleology, meaning orientations toward ends, and affectivity, which is how things 
matter (Schatzki, 1996). Schatzki is careful to mention that the ends, norms and forms of 
feeling in a practice need not be explicitly conscious goals for the actors. They must be seen as 
structural signifiers that give a sense of purpose (the “teleo” element) to practices as human 
projects of a particular kind, and that condition actors’ consent (the “affective” element) to 
achieving this particular kind of purpose (Kemmis et al., 2010). In this view, performance 
measurement practice is conditioned by the normativity of an overall sense to actions. In the 
situated context of PK in the Czech Republic, through engagement in practices, organisational 
members developed what it made sense for them to do, and it is this practical intelligibility that 
shaped, and was shaped by, the teleoaffective structure of the practice. 
For Schatzki, practice is neither purely an outcome of deliberate decisions, nor merely the 
summation of individual activities, but an interwoven network of understandings, rules, 
engagements, goals and emotions that prepares and guides practitioners’ thoughts, emotions 
and actions in the form of sayings and doings. Practice theory fosters an understanding of tacit 
and normativised aspects of practice as “dispositions to act” rather than mindless actions. The 
focus is on the skilful performance of social life, whereby practical understanding and learned 
behaviours lead individuals to become embedded in collective agencies, and thus produce 
normativity. Thus, it is not our aim to determine what organisational members should do, but 
what they are doing in a given context. 
Practices bring about social order by shaping the practical intelligibility that underlies 
practitioners’ actions. Artefacts, defined as “material objects” mobilised by and within 
practitioners (Schatzki, 2005, p. 61), are also important because they cause practices to 
“transpire” and work with them to mould the social order. Thus, Schatzki’s approach to practice 
supports interpretations not only of the “working” of practices (i.e. practitioners’ actions, 
interactions and understandings), but also of their “formation”, which can be appreciated in 
terms of the origination, perpetuation and alteration of actions that constitute making sense of 
the performance measurement practice. Implementing KPIs involves everyone in practices. In 
this sense, rather than being static, practices “evolve as circumstances change, opportunities 
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and problems arise, personnel change, new ideas arise, and so on” (Schatzki, 2005, pp. 475-
476). 
Schatzki’s practice theory is not new to management accounting researchers (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2007; Jørgensen and Messner, 2010), but this theoretical route rarely features in the 
field of performance measurement and in transitional context. We believe this will offer a 
nuanced understanding of what managers “actually do” in practice (Jorgensen and Messner, 
2010) and will enable us to problematise the application and implementations of contemporary 
management accounting tools such as KPIs.  
4. Research methods 
This paper draws on qualitative data collected through face-to-face interviews, and 
observations and documentary analysis of a single organisation, PK. Inspired by the 
epistemological instruction of Schatzki’s practice theory, we engaged ourselves in drawing out 
experience, meaning and intelligibility from a practice through actors’ practical actions and 
engagements. We believe participant observations would have provided deeper insights into 
the lived experience of practitioners and thereby an even better understanding of the micro-
processes of practices. The failure to do so was mainly because of a shortage of time, resources, 
and lack of access for becoming a participant observer. However, our approach sought to gain 
an initial insider perspective by digging into the agential narratives and stories of the actors’ 
lived experiences (Schatzki, 1996). 
PK was selected as a case study for several reasons. First, it represents a very common 
type of enterprise in the Czech Republic, where industry is largely automotive-based and the 
majority of firms are incorporated into car manufacturers’ supply chains. Second, PK was 
founded under a communist regime in 1956, so might reveal significant changes from a 
socialist cooperative to a modern joint stock company, giving the researchers an opportunity 
to understand the prelude to current performance measurement practices. Third, we were given 
full access to all actors in the company, partly owing to links with the company’s owners and 
the local universities from which two of the authors came. It was also very useful that the 
company owners were working as top-level managers, so the managers interviewed did not 
have to seek authorisation from the owners and were able to evaluate the extent to which some 
sensitive data could be disclosed, although the researchers had to sign a non-disclosure 
agreement. 
One important source of data was documentation to understand the company’s socio-
material setting. Archival data were drawn primarily from various company reports, and from 
political and historical literature on the Czech Republic and cooperatives. These documents 
were collected from libraries and the internet. Documents relating to the company’s 
organisational structure, performance reports and KPIs were accessed through the company’s 
website and gathered during and after the interviews. We had access to the whole KPI system. 
This was extremely useful to examine real time information on company’s performance 
measurement system. We have used this information formulating interview questions and 
discussed the output values on individual KPIs while interviewing the respondents. It was also 
useful to clarify any confusion regarding the KPIs. 
The interviews were carried out in three rounds. The first and second round of interviews 
were conducted between March and November 2018. They were supplemented by numerous 
telephone calls, visits, observations and meetings with the company’s officials for explanation 
and clarification until February 2019. The third round was conducted in March 2019. Prior to 
the interviews, the researchers explained the research objectives and told the interviewees that 
their answers would not be used to evaluate their job performance or attitudes. All interviews 
were taken place at the company’s site. Selection of the interviewees was based on their 
affiliation to the key company departments, their willingness to participate and duration of their 
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employment contract in PK. Interviewing the longest serving employees were useful to provide 
us longitudinal views of current KPIs and reflect on previous performance measurement 
system.  
The first round of interviews was rather broad in its scope, in terms of both the people 
interviewed and the topics covered. We interviewed two of the company’s owners. We had 
paid particular attention to the political context of the business environment and the specifics 
of cooperatives, which enabled us to identify the key actors in performance measurement 
practices. The second and third rounds were more focused and thus may be described as 
theoretical sampling (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) to probe deeper into themes identified in the 
first round and more generally during the many days spent at the company. During the second 
round, 26 interviews were conducted with six top-level managers, 11 mid-level managers and 
nine lower-level employees from various departments, including accounting, production and 
quality. During the third round of interviews we interviewed 10 top and middle managers. In 
total, we have conducted 38 interviews with 31 interviewees. 
Separate interview guides containing semi structured but open-ended questions were used 
to interview different level of managers: top managers (directors), mid-level managers and 
employees/workers. Interview guides were influenced by the positions they held. For instance, 
for top level managers, interviews were focused on broader questions such as goals of the new 
performance measurement, development of KPIs, priorities of KPI, Performance of KPIs in 
achieving goals, Evaluations of KPIs and also historical context of PM and KPIs at PK. 
Questions for mid-level managers were mainly focused on what changed since the 
implementation of KPIs, discussions on financial vs non-financial KPIs, monitoring, reporting 
and evaluation of KPIs. We also probed around the nature of practical understanding of actual 
use of KPIs, changing behavior of employees in relation to KPIs. Questions were slightly 
different for lower level employees. We focused on changes in daily activities owing to KPIs, 
links between KPIs and salaries, their understanding of KPIs within the organization. We 
sought illustrations or examples of their activities in relation to KPIs from all interviewees. 
These interview questions were geared to understand KPIs in actions from all levels of 
employees (practitioners).  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
The interviews were carried out by two co-authors, one of whom asked the questions while 
the other recorded the interviews and made notes. Most interviews lasted between 45 and 60 
minutes, although interviews with lower-level employees were usually shorter (20 minutes). 
After conducting all the interviews, those that had been recorded were translated and 
transcribed by professional translators. They were thoroughly reviewed by the Czech co-
authors who conducted the interviews. All interviews were conducted in Czech except the third 
round of interviews. The third round of interviews were conducted in English.  
In addition to the interviews, the researchers (two Czech co-authors) attended management 
board meetings, where they were able to listen to discussions about KPIs and observe 
managers’ reactions. These provided a picture of how CEO was pushing the KPIs. Also 
revealed how other top managers were not as enthusiastic as CEO. Our observations 
complemented what were already apparent during our interviews i.e. the frustration of other 
managers KPIs being unrealistic and inconsequential. Our observations were crucial in 
developing and refining themes. 
At the first stage, all relevant outputs from interviews, documentation and observations 
were noted, which were later organised under a particular theme (code). In this analysis, we 
constantly reworked our coding scheme/thematic analysis to capture nuances in the data and 
to theorise the process of doings, (re)actions and strategies as the theory prescribed. For 
instance, we initially created six key themes with 2-9 subthemes (35 in total). After much 
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discussions we have agreed to four key themes to articulate KPIs in action: unrealistic, 
inconsequential, stick and carrot and contradictory. We then reflected on our theoretical 
framework and further revised the themes. For instance, we sought to understand how 
organizational members respond to the KPIs. We worked on articulating responses from 
interviews and agreed on three key responses after much deliberations such as subjective 
assessment and manipulation, common sense or doing the job as given, and superficial 
compliance (symbolism).  
Finally, we reviewed the consistency between the data sources, the data codes/themes and 
the theoretical conclusions we had drawn. In order to ensure the validity of our research, we 
triangulated the results of our interviews with our findings from other data sources and the 
established literature. Internal validity was also achieved through pattern matching, which 
involves comparing empirical data with theoretical constructs and with previous studies. To 
strengthen the reliability of our data, we contacted the interviewees again to seek clarity in case 
of inconsistency. Practice theory, in particular, is very focused on authenticity as this is rooted 
in lived experience of practitioners. We conducted the interviews in native language and 
recorded the interviews complemented by observations and documentations to provide 
authentic accounts.  
5. Socio-material context of Czech cooperatives 
The first half of the 20th century was marked by the foundation of the new Czechoslovak 
Republic at the end of World War I in 1918, which was formed from three historical regions 
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy (Czechia, Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia). Czechia had 
previously held a very strong economic position within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Its 
economic strength had increased during the 19th century. For instance, in the 1890s it produced 
two thirds of the industrial output of the Austrian part of the monarchy (Urban, 2000).  
Cooperatives played a significant part in the Czechoslovak Republic’s economic 
development, and a leading role on the world stage. The first Czech cooperative was 
established in 1847, shortly after the world’s first cooperative was established in 1844 in 
Rochdale in the UK. Since then cooperatives started to develop very quickly in 
Czechoslovakia. The structure of these cooperatives was very heterogeneous. Most were 
consumer cooperatives, and the majority of members were agricultural labourers. More 
widespread development of cooperatives took place during the 1860s when many consumer, 
manufacturing and savings cooperatives were established, numbering 500 by the end of the 
decade. 1,326 cooperatives were operating in the country by 1921 (Vávrová, 2004). During the 
first Czechoslovak Republic, Czechia maintained its economic dominance, and the country 
was ranked as the tenth richest in 1924 and the tenth most industrially developed in the world 
in 1934 (Špitálský, J. & Munk, 1934).  
This development was halted by the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939, when 
all cooperatives was transferred to the Cooperatives Union and subordinated to the German 
military command. Following the establishment of the communist regime in 1948, all 
cooperatives came under the Central Bureau of Cooperatives and became part of the centrally 
planned communist economy. The Czechoslovak Republic’s rate of economic development 
slowed during the communist period but remained on a level with that of other Western 
European countries until the 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s, economic growth started to 
stagnate, leading to a fall in living standards (Holman 2000). Despite being under central 
command, the cooperatives remained relatively flexible and entrepreneurially active. In fact, 
cooperatives were only non-state type of businesses in socialist Czechoslovakia, that were (de-
jure) in the “private” ownership of the cooperative members (Vávrová, 2004). 
After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, the country turned to democracy and a 
market economy, which demanded massive economic transformation. Companies soon lost 
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their Eastern markets and were largely unable to compete with new imported goods. Both small 
and large enterprises were subject to privatisation, including cooperatives. Cooperatives 
remain important players in the Czech economy. Most agricultural cooperatives have been 
privatised, most housing cooperatives have survived, consumer cooperatives have continued 
to compete with foreign supermarket chains (the Co-op chain), savings cooperatives are 
expanding and mostly provide banking services (some have been transformed into banks), and 
manufacturing cooperatives have experienced various transformations, with some being 
privatised. Czech Economy also undertook dramatic changes in structure, with decrease of 
heavy industry, mining and steel production, and on other hand significant increase in 
manufacturing industry significantly focusing on automotive industry as the part of automotive 
industry supply chains. These changes can also be seen in our case study. 
The case company has the strong socialist heritage. The supervising authority in Czech 
Republic had strong control over cooperatives in relation to performance measures. Non-
financial measures were the main measures partly because market prices did not exist in the 
centrally planned economy making financial measures often irrelevant (Holman 2000). 
Nevertheless, cooperatives being in quasi form of private ownership, the drive towards 
increasing surplus value (profit) was not very uncommon.  
6. Performance measurement practices: KPIs in PK 
We structure the section in three parts. First, we present the organisational context of new 
performance measurement. This elaborates the intended KPIs. Second, we analyse how KPIs 
were implemented. This enables us to reflect on how and whether KPIs materialised as 
intended. Third, we discuss how organisational participants make sense of the new 
performance regime. 
 
6.1 Organisational Context and KPIs 
 
PK was established in 1956 as a cooperative of people with disabilities manufacturing 
PVC products, mainly for the construction and electronics industries. PK gradually developed 
and enlarged its production programme. For instance, in 1969 it started to do injection 
moulding, and in 1976 it built its factory buildings on the present site. Like other cooperatives 
in communist Czechoslovakia, performance measurement practices in PK were driven by 
cooperative members. Nevertheless, surplus was calculated using the centralised national 
measures. As the individual members of the cooperative were in fact co-owners and employees, 
profits were distributed among all employees after the contribution to the state coffers. The 
head of production (a longstanding employee) commented that the company’s behaviour had 
been generally very familial.  
Interviews with some employees who had worked there during the communist regime 
provided us with glimpses of performance measurement practices before 1989. In our case, the 
performance measurement system was significantly shaped by this cooperative heritage. PK 
had set both financial and non-financial measures for employees, connected with their 
individual bonuses. Some non-financial measures, such as quality and machine utilisation 
ratios, had survived the transformation and remained components of the present performance 
measurement system. This had changed following privatisation in 2003, long after the 1989 
event. The company now has no particular commitment to employing disabled people, having 
switched from a social to a purely capitalist focus. 
Details on performance indicators during the communist period were not available but we 
are informed that monthly and quarterly bonuses were based on performance indicators. Every 
quarter, all employees were evaluated to determine bonuses using a ranking system. 
Approximately a quarter of employees’ salaries was based on bonuses. However, PK had to 
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pay five per cent of the total production into a central pot called the “market fund”. The District 
Communist Committee monitored this very strictly, and bonuses could only be paid to 
employees after meeting the national targets. The cooperative members were fully engaged in 
running the cooperative, being on the board, setting up the performance measures and taking 
strategic decisions. A general meeting was held twice a year, and there was a mid-year general 
meeting where cooperative members gathered and discussed the financial results, long-term 
investments and other activities. Understanding and acceptance of performance measures 
among employees, who are also owners, had been very clear. Interviewees with employees. 
who have been in PK for a long time, talked about ‘family atmosphere’ during the cooperative 
period. They felt no pressure of achieving cooperative goals. This has changed soon after 
privatisation. 
During the cooperative period, PK was producing plastic parts for automotive (20%), 
keyboard (60%) and electrical products such as switches (20%). Its products had been 
struggling since 1989, especially in the field of computer keyboards, partly owing to the rise 
of China as the leading electronic equipment producer. The first decade after the fall of the 
communist regime brought no significant changes to PK apart from a huge staff turnover, 
especially at the top. Between 1997 and 2002, two unsuccessful attempts were made to 
privatise the company, and in 2003 it was sold to the current owners. It was sold based on 
agreement of all former cooperative members, who felt need for change for survival. Most of 
the members remained in the company as employee.  
After privatisation, PK began to focus on the automotive industry, with new production 
lines to produce plastic parts for this industry. The current owners did not make immediate 
changes to performance measurement. In 2006 they hired professional managers, but they were 
unable to change performance measurement in the way they had hoped. In 2008, the current 
owners (five people) took control of the management of the company and became heavily 
involved in running the company’s affairs. One owner became CEO and, using previous IT 
experience, started to develop KPIs. One of the reasons, CEO chose KPIs, was because he was 
trained in KPIs in his MBA programme. The MBA programme became popular soon after the 
transition. A new performance measurement system was introduced, based on 12 first-level 
(primary) KPIs and supported by eight second-level (secondary) KPI indicators, plus 
supervisory reports known as OSOH (translated as ‘personal evaluation’). 
    [Insert Table 2 & 3] 
Approximately 20 to 45 per cent of employees’ salaries are dependent on fulfilling the 
budgeted values of the chosen KPIs (on average three KPIs for each position). The full new 
system took effect in 2008, preceded by gradual implementation. The KPIs are allocated to 39 
performance units. Individual KPIs apply only to directors (top management), with few 
exceptions. All 12 primary and three out of eight secondary measures are financial, using 
accounting items such as contribution margin and modified profit. The remaining six secondary 
measures are non-financial, but these appear to be only for monitoring and reporting purposes. 
In addition, only four out of the 39 performance units are allocated non-financial KPIs. To 
complement the primary and secondary KPIs, line managers’ reports are taken into 
consideration through personal evaluation (additional layer).  
The CEO sees KPIs working as an accurate information system – a good error free 
information system that enables strong supervision – not just as a bonus-calculating machine. 
He stated: 
There was a relatively high error rate. Once these indicator systems began to focus 
on those details, the error rate gradually began to decrease, the people were pushed 
into a corner, where there was a lower error rate and a bit better supervision. 
Our interviews with top-level managers revealed that the introduction of a performance 
measurement system had come as no surprise, given the automotive industry’s high 
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competitiveness, product structure and customer requirements, and of course the CEO’s strong 
enthusiasm. Some managers thought the change had been necessary, arguing that the old 
system had lost its relevance and they had all felt that something needed to be done. KPIs 
seemed to fill the gaps in the enterprise. The CEO further rationalised the change, arguing that 
the new system had laid a strong foundation for better management control, profitability and 
ability to measure individual performance. 
6.2 Implementations of KPIs and Unanticipated Consequences 
 
Most employees, including top-level managers, had not been particularly involved in 
determining the detail of the KPIs. Many made comments such as “I do not know” or “I have 
not investigated that” regarding the KPI-setting process. One employee commented: “our 
CEO, who has a very good education, explains KPI to the heads of department who happen to 
agree without understanding any of it. I know it looks nice, but the effect for normal people is 
severe.” The functional managers are allowed some discussion of the indicators in order to 
adjust the KPI targets, but everything is approved by the CEO. New KPIs are suggested but 
often brushed aside. Consequently, departmental heads find it difficult to communicate or 
convince employees of their necessity. The head of sales stated: “I think the flow of information 
from top downwards is very bad. … It seems to me that the ‘top floor’, figuratively speaking, 
does not always see everyday life as it really is, the production here.” One head of the 
department acknowledged the problem that the KPIs are not known to employees and 
commented: 
Those indicators should be actually crumbled and distributed among the people, 
which actually happens to various extents here and there. However, I am not so 
foolish as to think that regular workers, and even the middle management, would be 
able to describe the indicator in detail. 
Even after ten years of implementation, discussions between the CEO and directors (heads 
of departments) are still about how to implement the system to meet the CEO’s expectations. 
The sales director confirmed this, saying that “There is always discussion when composing the 
table … and the main impulse came from the owners.” These discussions rest on which KPIs 
to use, reporting, and setting boundaries and goals. The head of the purchasing department also 
stated: “The directors propose indicators suitable for each department, and the CEO or the top 
management decide; they say yes or no.” The CEO did not acknowledge the ongoing debate 
and commented: “There is always a discussion of what is measurable, what is tolerable, and 
how it turns out. It is an endless process, every month there is a demand – ‘Look, correct this 
and that, do this differently, we do not have the skills to do this and that so it hurts us that you 
are punishing us’, etcetera.” Employees raise concerns with their respective heads, who 
discuss the issue with the CEO, if relevant. The respondents confirmed this process: “This we 
discuss more likely … with our boss … The boss, when some goals are set absurdly, he goes to 
the owners, the top management and discusses it with them” and “Just now we were discussing 
some possible change with the boss. So, it’s more a question of what we are able to influence, 
which indicators.” 
The underlying philosophy of the new KPIs reflects how the CEO perceived the 
company’s problems during the cooperative period. Criticising the previous performance 
measurement system, he justified the change: “it turned out that the company did not know …. 
how to calculate product profitability. It took the company a few years to implement a product-
level forecasting system.” He also articulated the company’s cash and debt problem even before 
the financial crisis. He commented: “This led to all these changes, so matters of survival of the 
company arose, the company was highly indebted and needed to generate cash and was under 
pressure.” The CEO’s fundamental idea is that if the company does well financially, everything 
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will fall into place, so the KPIs must be directly linked with financial items such as modified 
profit and contribution margin. This idea is shared by top-level managers. The top-level 
managers do not see any conflation issue in using accounting figures such as contribution 
margin to quantify performance measures. The financial controller said: “Something financial 
is more easily measurable. You can count it more easily and it is more valid.” The director of 
quality stated: “I think that is naive. The idea that something could be genuinely ‘non-financial’ 
is naive. I think that everything turns over to financial indicators in the end anyway.” This is, 
of course, a clear departure from PK’s recent past and goes against the very basic idea of 
performance technologies, where non-financial indicators are measured to affect financial 
results. In practice, formulating a direct causal link between individual employees’ 
performance and accounting profit such as modified profit is problematic and arbitrary. It is 
also seen by employees as such. The personal evaluation (line manager’s report) was 
introduced to supplement KPIs and personalise the performance indicators. 
Modified profit is a constant KPI for almost everyone in the company. Almost all 
employees are at least partly rewarded on the basis of final modified financial items, as shown 
in Table 3. Other KPIs are also affected by the financial results, as the contribution margin is 
used to quantify the performance measures. The idea behind this is that this indicator represents 
collective responsibility. They are also seen as an objective assessment and beyond 
manipulations by employees. The CEO and top management do seem to acknowledge that 
financial performance itself affects KPIs, by either inflating or deflating measures depending 
on the contribution margin. This is perhaps to ensure that bonuses will only be paid if the 
company is doing well, irrespective of employees’ work performance.  
However, the major problem for each performance unit is to measure relative performance 
within the unit. For instance, all employees within a performance unit have the same KPIs. In 
the new performance measurement regime, line managers’ reports, known as personal 
evaluation, play an important role. Thirty-four out of 39 units employ personal evaluation to 
complement the primary and secondary KPIs. These supervisory reports are useful in 
differentiating employees, but in reality cause more problems than they resolve. This is partly 
because the way personal evaluation is executed. Top managers themselves reported that 
collegiality within the unit force them not to differentiate between employees who work in a 
close proximity or the same tasks. The personal evaluation rate begins with 100% and the 
supervisor/line manager reduces the rate counting the faults/mistakes made by employees – 
seen as a stick than a carrot. Departmental heads also find it difficult to sell non-financial 
indicators to employees, as explained below. 
The annual process of setting KPIs starts at the beginning of the calendar year. Targets set 
for financial KPIs are usually based on the company’s budgeted statements. Targets for non-
financial KPIs are based on the previous year, but with certain expectations of continuous 
improvement each year. Each performance unit is assigned a specific number of two to five 
KPIs with relative weightings and monthly targets. At the end of the month, the actual values 
of the KPIs are calculated and compared with the targets. Fulfilment of the KPIs is instantly 
transferred into the wages for the relevant month. If the KPIs are not fulfilled, the reasons and 
possible solutions are analysed and discussed. The operationalisation of KPIs in PK has been 
subjected to severe criticisms by employees with unanticipated consequences. KPIs are 
frequently referred to as “unrealistic”, “inconsequential”, “contradictory” and “stick instead of 
a carrot”. These aspects are discussed below. 
 
Unrealistic  
Many of our conversations with employees revealed a sense of alienation. This is partly 
because of the way in which the KPI targets are formulated and imposed on employees. Many 
opined that the targets are often unreachable, especially when markets are tough, as in 2018. 
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Many employees believe that targets are often set without deeper knowledge of actual 
circumstances. For instance, increasing the sales targets every year (one of the KPIs for 
salespeople) is somewhat inappropriate for a smaller supply chain in the automotive industry, 
partly because sales are relatively stable and involve long-term contracts. Lack of attention to 
externalities in setting KPIs was clear in our interviews with all levels of employee. Lower-
level employees, especially, often think that targets for KPIs are set too high and without 
consultation. One employee commented that high targets had increased during the year: “The 
goal has increased by 5% or 10% more than before, but if the goal increases by 80%, it is 
really not good.” This 80 per cent increase was probably a rare occasion, but the complaint 
was well-founded, as interviews with the employees revealed. One of the project technologists 
reflected: It´s about setting real goals. This year for example the set goal had changed during 
the year, it went higher…. It goes to demotivate people. It is counter-productive because when 
people know they are not able to fulfil the goal, they rather do nothing. Employees understand 
the rationale for pressures on the targets but many observe that these targets are often unreal. 
 
Inconsequential 
The KPIs are widely seen as inconsequential. Construction of the indicators was criticised 
mainly because employees’ higher performance does not necessarily influence departmental 
or individual KPIs. Because most KPIs are based on bottom-line accounting items, it is 
unsurprising that employees are often evaluated negatively, even if they are working well. For 
instance, a constant KPI, “modified profit”, which mainly reflects the company’s overall 
financial performance, may not necessarily be a true reflection of what lower-level employees 
are doing in the factory. Some top-level managers justified this, saying that it ensures 
employees’ overall engagement with the company, but this is not guaranteed. For instance, 
KPIs such as quality and machine utilisation will always improve the company’s bottom line, 
yet most employees’ bonuses are linked with modified profit. Some employees find this deeply 
unfair. This is coupled with the fact that conflated KPIs mean that the performance measures 
are often inconsequential for their bonuses.  
 
Acknowledging this problem, some top-level managers blamed the limitations of data 
collection and processing, and inability to link individual employees’ performance directly 
with KPIs. As the director of quality mentioned: 
We are then still lacking the motive like “that person has fulfilled all their tasks and 
someone else made a mistake elsewhere”. This indicator applies across the whole 
factory – the factory owner reduces the bonuses, yet this particular person has 
achieved all their goals and even something beyond, so they should receive some 
extra award. However, how could one identify such an individual among the crowd 
of employees? One would basically need to chop the entire factory into some very 
small units, encountering the issues of individual supervision and control of such 
units, implying the need for more group leaders or managers; and this is not really 
the case over here. 
This only causes serious dissatisfaction and suspicion about the validity of KPIs among 
employees, and indeed top-level managers, but also a sense of bewilderment. Many said “I do 
not know why I am getting less bonus or salaries”. One mid-level manager from the logistics 
department summarised: 
People are getting to the stage when they don’t care anymore, they just give in. I’m 
not sure the bosses are aware of this…  we used to have a working environment 
where we cursed and swore when we were in trouble, but we hung together and 
eventually worked everything out... Today, I often have a feeling that they just don’t 
care. 
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Two reasons can be surmised to explain the employees’ perplexity. First, the target values 
for the indicators are often set at the planned level, which means that the expected output of 
the measured unit (department) is usually set at 100 per cent of the plan, linked to 100 per cent 
of bonuses. Any reduction in output will lead to a cut in bonuses, which causes significant 
unhappiness in the unit, especially when employees perceive contradictions between the KPIs 
and external influences. Second, inability to set very specific and controllable KPIs for 
individuals leads to bonus cuts for reasons unknown to them. For instance, lower scores within 
the unit bring collective punishment for everyone. 
 
Contradictory 
We observed references to contradictory indicators in many interviews. For instance, one 
manager said: 
I don’t remember all of them right now, but we found out that each [person] has 
about three indicators. …. sometimes the indicators are conflicting.  
Conflicting KPI indictors are not only at the individual level but also at the departmental level. 
Contradictory KPIs such as quality versus buying cheaper material, or quantity of stock versus 
availability of material or the purchase price of materials remain unaddressed. Logistics are 
measured by lower inventory; yet if the logistics department achieves lower inventory, in some 
cases the production departments may not have anything to produce. The head of purchasing 
commented: 
Yes, because they were not allowed to hold supplies. And it affected me in the way 
that the production went out for those people for a week, and because it is a mounting 
on a specific machine, then it was not in my power to catch up under normal 
conditions. The production employees should not have been scored low as this was 
an uncontrollable factor, but under KPI calculations, they received lower scores.  
These contradictions are reflected in the overall financial indicators. One top-level manager 
commented on the contradictory relationship between stock of material and profit. For 
instance, direct material turnover encourages employees to buy lower volumes of stock, 
which costs the company as it misses out on material discounts and endangers production. 
If a department does not perceive the consequences for other departments, the strict focus 
on departmental indicators very often harms the results of other departments. According to 
some interviewees, these effects are very frequent and occur almost daily.  
 
Stick instead of a carrot 
The perception of a large number of employees is that KPIs are there to cut salaries. This 
is often phrased as “if you do not perform 100 per cent, you do not get the full salaries”. As a 
sales director explained: “It cannot be 150 per cent or 200 per cent; it can be 100 per cent 
maximum which is, in my opinion, not so motivational.” The design of the system and the target 
values of the indicators are based mainly on 100 per cent fulfilment of the plan. It appears that 
if everything is going well and the employees make no mistakes, they expect the 100 per cent 
bonus or “full salaries”. However, their 100 per cent achievement of error-free tasks may not 
necessarily contribute to 100 per cent of the targets, which leads to bonus cuts or reductions in 
salaries. Alternatively, if they achieve more than the planned output, no additional bonuses are 
attached. This results in low or no motivation to surpass the targets. Similarly, employees feel 
that they were working hard simply to secure the “full salary”. 
Given this distance between the KPIs and the realities of performance, questions are raised 
about the validity of the KPIs. This is not unacknowledged by departmental heads and top 
management, and has been central to discussions over the last ten years.  
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6.3 Making Sense of KPIs 
 
We focus here on how organisational participants make sense of the new performance 
regime, given the above problems. We find that the organisational members adopt a more 
pragmatic approach to performance measurement, embracing KPIs’ subjective assessment and 
manipulation, common sense or doing the job as given, and superficial compliance 
(symbolism), as discussed below. 
Subjective assessment and manipulation 
Subjective assessment of KPIs – a form of discretion – is well documented in the 
performance measurement literature (Woods, 2012). Similar evidence is found in our case. 
Only the CEO has discretionary power, and top-level managers do not intervene. Describing 
discretion, the CEO argued: 
When you look at our Excel tables, from where we take the KPIs, you will usually 
find some notes from me on what should be bent and taken into account. Sometimes 
it takes a few months for the problem to be either fixed somehow or figured out or 
forgotten. It is not possible to take the Excel tables and say that everything is good 
or bad. Sometimes good and bad is not the same as bonuses and “anti-bonuses”. 
Lack of discretion to set targets for line managers or heads of department perhaps paves the 
way for heavy reliance on subjective assessment. Discretion is also used by departmental heads 
using the personal evaluation and rewarding special bonus to employees. 
Recollecting on the project, one manager commented that they subjectively judge 
employees’ performance based on their experience, especially when KPIs do not really reflect 
the employees’ task performance. For a sales director, “when evaluating the individuals of that 
design team, it happens. But, of course, it is about a feeling; we do not play the numbers 
anymore.” One head of department commented: 
Sometimes an indicator is strict and somebody has a feeling they can’t move with it, 
it is more negative, it was contra productive in rationalisation: ‘I manage to save 
once, but next year I get punished for that, so why should I do that? All effort will be 
duly punished.’ The work with figures was bad, and nobody worked out how to relate 
them correctly, how to make the information valid. 
These comments were corroborated by other heads of department. The financial controller 
seemed to agree with the above problems and commented: “We are not able to rationalise 
(saving costs) further.” Thus, departmental heads have almost no choice but to inject as much 
as subjectivity as possible into their assessments. One head commented: “It’s all a question of 
healthy composition. When that is set up correctly and people know they will get reward for 
their effort, and when they don’t try then… When some KPIs are conflicting, it is a problem 
for the people… I have to choose either/or…” This is tolerated at the top level. One board 
member went so far as to claim that KPIs may well be counter-productive and induce 
dysfunctional behaviour. He went on to provide illustrations of how this may transpire. 
Lower-level workers expressed similar views. Perhaps a lack of flexibility or discretionary 
power encourages manipulation of the figures such as under reporting. Special bonuses are 
often paid if profits are higher, even if the KPI targets have not exactly been met. Nevertheless, 
this does not stop some from “playing” the numbers. For instance, sometimes employees 
under-report performance in one period to save for the next KPI period, in order to maximise 
the impact on salaries. This is not unrecognised by the top management. There is a restriction 
on how much bonus employees can claim. This induces some engineers to stop producing after 
reaching the targets and to keep some unfinished work for the next cycle of the bonus period. 
Estimates of semi-finished products and finished products for the period have been introduced 
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to stop this manipulation, but the problem continues, as the CEO and other top-level managers 
confirmed. Two KPIs are no longer use due to attempts of manipulations. One such primary 
performance indicator (RAC, known as cost saving). Top managers claimed this is too 
expensive to monitor and open for manipulations. The same goes for another indicator ‘PPM’ 
(number of products with low quality per 1million of products). Managers find employees are 
hiding the quality problems to achieve higher score and also leads to higher costs to achieve 
higher quality.  
Applying common sense or doing the job 
There is overwhelming evidence of disinterest, resignation, lack of commitment and 
frustration among all levels of employee regarding the new performance measurement 
practices. We sought to establish how they are making sense of the changes. The main narrative 
coming out of our interviews with all levels of employee is that “we are using our common 
sense or simply doing our jobs as best as we could do and we have done before”. Mid to top 
level managers provided us a number of scenarios where they themselves went against their 
KPIs just to maintain the quality of the products. Quality of the products ultimately keep the 
company moving and keep their jobs as they argued. One Head of Production provided an 
example: “An example is the machining of the parts for paint shop, that they have some 
overspray and are contaminated by the burrs of cutting, I had to spend time on cleaning and 
process the parts further fully knowing this will negatively affect my productivity.” Many 
cannot see any substantial changes to practices arising from the KPIs. One lower-level 
employee who has worked there both pre and post-KPIs reflected: “To be honest, there were 
definitely some changes, but I cannot say that they were significant. We’ve already got used to 
it, so it’s hard to judge that way back.” The only thing that has changed for them is the salary 
structure. Some commented that they have found a ‘new way of paying salaries’. 
Many believe that the KPIs have made no real impact on their work efforts, so the best 
thing they can do is to carry out their jobs as before. Even some top-level managers do not see 
KPIs as a deal breaker in bringing about changes to work in the company. One top-level 
manager said: “I am not really sure it brought any changes, something maybe did. This was 
rather mixed with other changes which happened in that period.” Most senior managers were 
unable to articulate the impact of the changes on outcomes. The head of the production 
department said: “there is growing something, for example production or new technologies and 
so on, so the company is moving forward, but it is difficult for me to say if it is also thanks to 
these indicators or not”. The common narrative for many is that they are so dependent on 
external markets that internal processes are often inconsequential. However, the KPIs are seen 
as a serious attempt to motivate employees so that externalities can be minimised. Clearly, 
KPIs themselves are embodied with market externalities, causing employees to give up on 
them. 
Employees whose KPIs are particularly inconsequential are resigned to the fact that it is 
meaningless to make any attempt to achieve them. Thus, simply doing the job and showing no 
interest in the KPIs is common in the factory. One manager in logistics commented: “I use my 
common sense. I simply focus, and KPIs are in the background.” Another head commented: 
It’s hard. I’m actually taking care of maintaining the shapes, so I do not take care so 
much about these details. It’s important for me to have tools that are working and 
just to fix them as soon as it is needed. So I cannot know here are some numbers; I 
just have to have my work done. 
This is not to say that employees are not involved in KPIs at all. They try to suggest alternatives 
for new measures or relaxed target values that will make little change to the KPIs. The only 
time employees seem to be concerned with them is when bonuses are affected. One manager 
commented: “I make myself heard when someone touches my bonuses, I’ll admit that 
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straightaway. Otherwise, I do my job; it must be done.” These proposed adjustments are often 
made in order to strengthen individuals’ influence over the indicator to avoid collective 
punishment or reward, but to no avail. 
Employees lower down the chain rarely concern themselves with the KPIs, as long as they 
do not hamper bonuses. Some employees do not know much about the system, nor even 
perceive the existence of the KPIs. Many employees do not recognise that anything has 
changed, so have not noticed the KPIs. Lack of engagement was very clear among all levels of 
employee. The heads of department clearly acknowledged that the KPIs often do not reflect 
practice or the efforts made by employees. This has led to the rise of symbolism, as presented 
below. 
The rise of symbolism 
The practice of KPIs is dominated by reporting the “right” indicators. This is crucial, as it 
determines a proportion of organisational participants’ wages. Each unit has to report its results 
a few days after the end of the month. Common complaints are that there is enormous pressure 
and lack of time to prepare these reports. This led to some creative reporting especially 
secondary KPIs. The secondary KPIs was designed to drive performance as interviews 
revealed. Nevertheless, due to the low level of focus, they turned into “symbolic” indicators. 
This is acknowledged by the managers, including the CEO. Some (non-financial) KPIs are 
always reported as 100 per cent. For instance, the number of logistics incidents has always 
been reported as zero; hence they achieve a perfect score of 100 per cent. The managers suspect 
and claim that it is almost impossible not to have any incidents. The sales manager reported: 
“It [billing] is not an indicator that can influence someone’s bonuses. There is just given 100 
per cent, and no one works with it anymore.” Our discussions with the CEO and board members 
in an informal board meeting revealed that importance is given to the primary indicators, with 
indifference to the secondary indicators, as they fail to explain and have forgotten some of the 
secondary indicators in operation at PK. This is partly because the secondary indicators do not 
affect salaries for most performance units, but are used only to monitor progress. One head 
claimed: “The second-level indicator, more like the performance standard.” The technical 
director commented: “The primary ones are used; the secondary ones are formal. Expiration 
of paint (as an indicator) was a problem; it was being monitored. There is no problem now – 
it’s strictly formal.” Interviews with top-level managers and the CEO revealed that secondary 
KPIs are at a developmental stage and much discretion is involved.  
Some employees, including mid-level managers, do not recognise even the primary KPIs. 
This may well be because of common disengagement of employees with the KPIs. It is also 
because of some creative reporting even in primary KPIs as acknowledged by accounting 
report preparers. Partly because of time pressures and partly because of the politics of wages, 
sometimes, they had to prepare the KPIs using estimates instead of actual results. This often 
creates confusion among employees, as they are sometimes unclear about why they have 
received lower bonuses this month than last month. Most employees have no access to the data 
to dismantle the indicators and understand their performance. They often go away thinking 
they must have done something wrong and shrug it off. In some cases, employees come back 
to ask about reductions in bonuses, but one manager commented that they have no choice but 
to accept them. Some managers blamed the information gathered for KPIs.  
Given the strong mistrust, information on KPIs have little value to many employees and 
almost no relevance to their actual work efforts. Many believe that bad indicators do not usually 
mean that something needs to be improved; rather, they may have been wrongly calculated or 
do not reflect their work. The CEO also acknowledged the problem and claimed he KPIs must 
change things on the ground, otherwise there is no point in having them, because it is bad 
management if the KPIs do not produce change or correct errors.  
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7. Discussion: Practical theoretical understanding of performance measurement 
We sought to provide a theoretical account of how organisational participants 
respond/make sense of the “new regime” of KPIs in a transitional economy. We also explain 
why KPIs did not materialise as intended. Close examinations of ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’ of 
practitioners/employees in the context of new KPIs would address our concerns. Schatzki 
(1996), argue these ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’ are linked by pools of understanding pertaining to 
action, a collection of rules or instructions that regulate them, and a teleoaffective structure that 
orients them. These are further discussed below. 
The rules or instructions that regulate performance measurement are important to note 
before we engage with the discussions of practical understanding and teeloaffective structure 
that orients practioners/employees. Intended performance measurement rules were to execute 
12 first-level (primary) KPIs and supported by eight second-level (secondary) KPI indicators, 
plus supervisory reports (personal evaluation). The performance measurement practices unfold 
concurrently, as manifested in the practitioners’ comments. Most distinguish between 
important and developmental KPIs, which do not follow the rules of performance measurement 
where a differentiation is made between primary and secondary KPIs. For many, the primary 
KPIs set in the rules do not necessarily reflect reality on the ground, so they adjust them to 
reflect the mood of affected parties. In Schatzkian terminology, practitioners implement 
performance measurement according to “what makes sense to them to perform” (Schatzki, 
2001). Thus, the practical implementation of some KPIs remains symbolic or ceremonial, in 
the sense that it does not substantially change work patterns. Previous research has highlighted 
how a single individual such as the CEO, or control models (e.g. top management commitment, 
employee attitudes) may determine the “effectiveness” of performance measurement (Haas and 
Speckbacher, 2017). This study instead takes a more complex view, in which performance 
measurement functioning is a “contingent outcome” of various elements. Employees reactions 
at PK such as symbolism, manipulations and applying common sense demonstrate that changes 
in the rules, i.e. KPIs, are supposed to change the activities performed by employees at different 
levels, although how the employees actually execute them depends strongly on their 
understanding and interpretation of KPIs as a practice.  
The imposition of KPIs with little consultation explains why top management has 
difficulty reaching an adequate practical understanding. Previous studies have argued for 
employee participation and a developmental approach to setting up KPIs (Wouters and 
Wilderom, 2008; Groen et al., 2012). This is also found in our case. The CEO’s sensitivity to 
cash generation favours the enhancement of financially dominant KPIs, but similar sensitivities 
are absent from employees, as transpired from the interviews. Schatzki (2001, 2005) asserts 
that in their efforts to implement practices, people mobilise artefacts. In the current analysis, 
similar artefacts, such as training courses, consultations and communications to encourage 
interactions between the various members involved in executing the new performance 
measurement, are absent. These artefacts would foster a broader understanding of what 
performance measurement consists of and the major duties arising from its adoption.  
At PK, interactions existed, if any, only at the level of top management. The bonus part of 
the salary, driven by financial KPIs, can only be paid if market does well. Integrating market 
risk with the employees’ salaries has been rejected widely by employees. Employees have often 
no idea now they have received less salaries. Many believe that bad indicators do not usually 
mean that something needs to be improved; rather, they may have been wrongly calculated or 
do not reflect their work. Thus, the practical understanding of performance measurement held 
by organisational members is at odds with the CEO’s understanding KPIs. It does not steer 
practical understandings in any particular direction, so practical understanding develops from 
how practitioners cope with the new rules. In other words, the intelligibility of KPIs affects 
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business activities only if the basis for practical intelligibility is shared by all, or at least by 
individuals affected by the process. 
The functioning of performance measurement requires acceptance of the primary KPIs by 
organisational participants. It did not transpire at PK. Some employees, including mid-level 
managers, do not recognise even the primary KPIs. The finance office and heads of department 
participate in calculating and reporting the KPIs, yet enacting even the primary KPIs is 
problematic, and the secondary KPIs are subject to superficial compliance. Some (non-
financial) KPIs are always reported as 100 per cent. The actual effects depend on how 
practitioners make sense of the “lived experience” of KPIs, according to extant rules and their 
practical understandings, aims and beliefs. The ‘lived experience’ at PK is one of resignation 
instead of embracing the KPIs reflected in the interviews. Symbolism, manipulation, subjective 
assessment, applying common sense and just doing the job in performance measurement 
practice, in a variety of ways, are derived from the subjectivities of actors constructed inter- 
and intra-discursively through space and tensions.  
There are explicit expectations of KPIs for motivating and improving the company’s 
performance by the CEO (Haas and Speckbacher, 2017). However, we argue, drawing on 
Schatzki’s works and previous studies, the imposed normative principles of KPIs are shaped 
by practitioners’ skilful agency in prioritising vested interests (Andon et.al. 2007; Arnabolidi 
and Azzone, 2010) and their experience of “know-how”. Schatzki (2001), in particular, argue 
that the know-how of what to do on the job (in the absence of any particular steer) shapes the 
“sayings” (meanings, discourses) and “doings” (bodily actions) of practice. Practical 
understandings provide a window through which to look into the process by which imposed 
KPIs gain intelligibility and meanings, such as “complicated”, “irrelevant/inconsequential”, 
“salary cut”, “collective punishment” and “CEO’s pet project”. The employees interviewed are 
aware of the impact of KPIs on their salaries, and take action accordingly if they are able to 
exert any influence. We need to place employees’ sayings and thinking (mind) about KPIs, 
such as being “contradictory”, “top down”, “inconsequential”, “having no effect on jobs”, 
alongside their doings (bodily activities). Comments such as ‘putting the KPIs in the 
background’ and ‘focus on the job’ and ‘get the job done’ are some of those examples of bodily 
activities of employees. This formed the practical understanding of performance measurement 
at PK. 
The “teleoaffective” structure enables us to see, given the participants’ understanding of 
the new performance measurement and KPIs, what makes sense for the projects they are 
pursuing. For Schatzki, projects may not necessarily be conscious goals for the actors but 
structural signifiers that give a sense of purpose (the “teleo” element) and condition actors’ 
consent (the “affective” element).  The teleoaffective formations described here, arising from 
the purposive projects of actors, such as “just doing the job”, “manipulation”, “raising one’s 
voice if necessary” and “symbolic/ceremonial practices”, have important implications for 
rendering the implementation of the new performance measurement rules irrelevant. It is clear 
that the rise of symbolic performance measurement reporting and practices, using common 
sense and manipulation, is deeply inscribed in the structural blueprints of practices. Not all 
organisational participants are engaged in symbolism or manipulation. Some are resigned to 
the fact they are better off just doing their jobs and ignoring the KPIs. Some raise their voices 
if space allows. These are not inconsistent with previous studies which examined tensions in 
performance measures, (Giovannoni et al., 2013), resistance (Modell, 2003), and messy 
interpretations of organisational actors (Sandhu et al., 2008). Nevertheless, examining these 
through a practice theory lens, we would argue, all these practical actions are clearly enacted 
through the skilled agency of organisational members – their learned behaviour within the 
socio-material context of practice involving the power of the CEO, market externalities and the 
communist legacy.  
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We also find the normativised aspects of performance measurement practice are crucial to 
understanding the symbolism or manipulation surrounding the implementation of the KPIs. 
These relate to the collective development of what participants take to be normal ways of doing 
organisational activities. For instance, employees themselves went against their KPIs just to 
maintain the quality of the products. Quality of the products ultimately keep the company 
moving and keep their jobs as they argued. They see broader purpose of the organisation more 
important than the KPIs. 
A practice theoretical approach shed new light to the debate of performance measurement 
practices in a number of ways. First, this empirical study shows that the functioning of KPIs 
relies on a shared interpretation of what is “proper” according to practitioners. The 
appropriateness of KPIs comes from practitioners’ experience of what works for them. A sense 
that KPIs are inappropriate produces a variety of unintended consequences, including 
manipulation and snubbing as also demonstrated in previous studies (Andon et al., 2007; 
Modell, 2003). Second, the “teleoaffective” formation of employees (purposive projects of 
actors) is crucial to embrace new practice such as KPIs. The purposive projects of actors at PK 
seems to be “just doing the job”, “manipulation”, “and “symbolic practices”, are not what new 
performance measurement models are expected to generate. It was intended to do the quite 
opposite. Third, the new KPIs did not produce intended outcomes. According to Schatzki 
(2005, p.61), the essential element to steer practice is to have an Artefacts. Artefacts, defined 
as “material objects” mobilised by and within practitioners are important because they cause 
practices to “transpire” and work with them to mould the social order. KPIs needed to have an 
Artefacts. However, there was little “orchestration” of interactions between practitioners in our 
case. Finally, practitioners’ skilful agency and their experience of “know-how” is important in 
the absence of any particular steer. New performance measurement model did not go through 
a consultation process. Employees have never understood the justifications of KPIs but only 
see new KPIs as punishment. In absence of fuller engagements, practitioners do what they are 
used to do and resist (as much as possible) the new regime of KPIs. Common sense forms the 
basis of performance measurement practices. 
8. Concluding remarks 
Returning to the question set out earlier we articulate the contributions of the paper. They 
are two-fold. First, how do organisational participants respond/make sense of the “new regime” 
of performance measurement in a transitional economy? We have explored, following Schatzki 
(1996)’s instructions, rules, practical understanding, and a teleoaffective structure of new 
performance regime. We find rules for primary and secondary KPIs were confusing for 
practitioners leading to do what makes sense for them to do. Developing a ‘practical 
understanding’ of participants enabled us to understand the employees’ pragmatic approach 
i.e. adopting a strategy of “taking in” some performance measures while tolerating other 
measures if necessary. For instance, employees simply focus on doing their jobs, turning a 
blind eye to performance measurement, subjective assessment, symbolism and manipulation 
by managers. We demonstrate, the intelligibility of KPIs to practitioners is critical as it enables 
practical understandings of performance measurement by orienting practitioners’ identification 
of “what needs to be done”. Such understandings may well differ from the aims of the 
instigators, but are nevertheless crucial. Practitioners’ understandings of what makes sense of 
doings and sayings represent the difference between what is intended and what actually 
happens. Also, as Schatzki noted, the “teleoaffective” structure is central to ‘what actually 
happens’. The teleoaffective formations described here, arising from the purposive projects of 
actors, such as “just doing the job”, “manipulation”, “raising one’s voice if necessary” and 
“symbolic/ceremonial practices”, have important implications for rendering the 
implementation of the new performance measurement rules irrelevant. Building on this, we 
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focus on the “organisation of practice” itself, seeking thereby to unravel the “doings” of 
organisational participants in changing settings (the socio-material context). This paper, 
inspired by Schatzki, has paid attention to “organisations of practice” rather than focusing on 
institutional factors, agential interests and constructions of meaning (Modell, 2001, 2003; 
Ahrens and Chapman, 2002; Andon et al., 2007; Arnaboldi and Azzone, 2010; Munir et al., 
2013), This, in turn, allowed us to unmask inherent tensions and contradictions in new regime 
of performance measurement such as KPIs, making a crucial contribution to debate on 
‘performance measurement in practice’. 
Second, does the new KPIs materialise as intended? New KPIs were intended to provide 
error free performance information system and sought to reward good employees. We find the 
application of KPIs did not materialise as intended. KPIs were introduced at PK around 10 
years ago. Eight secondary measures only serve the symbolic or ceremonial purpose. 12 
primary KPIs are directly linked with salaries. Immediately, employees saw them as a stick 
instead of a carrot. Common criticisms include lack of specific individualised KPIs, collective 
punishment, and contradictory, inconsequential, top-down and unrealistic KPIs. Few studies 
that exist in transitional economies rarely discussed unintended consequences of contemporary 
management accounting tools (Moilanen, 2007). The paper extends extant research on the 
application of contemporary management accounting tools in transitional economies (Albu & 
Albu, 2012; Cadez and Guilding, 2007).  
Research on emerging economies (non-transitional economies), on the other hand, have 
demonstrated how new management accounting technologies clashes with varying traditional, 
cultural and political contexts and led to various unintended consequences (Ashraf and Uddin, 
2013; Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Hopper et al., 2009; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). 
Extending the existing studies on management accounting in emerging economies, this paper 
focuses on the micro-processes of performance measurement systems to develop an 
understanding of diffusion of contemporary management accounting practice. We argue that 
Schatzki’s approach has been insightful in explaining unintended consequences and how to 
steer practice.  According to Schatzki (2005), essential elements to steer practice are to have 
an artefacts, teleoaffectivity, know-how and skilful agential actions. New KPIs did not produce 
the “teleoaffective” formation for new KPIs among employees. New performance 
measurement system was not mobilised within the organisation and no or little orchestration 
of interactions. In absence of this mobilisation or artefacts and orchestration, practitioners’ 
skilful agency and ‘know-how’ are crucial. They were also absent. Thus, practitioners 
(employees) have done what they needed to which is employing their common sense to interact 
with the KPIs leading to unintended outcomes. 
Finally, the paper has some research and practical implications. First, we believe the paper 
would be interesting to researchers because of its explanation of performance measurement 
practice in a distinct empirical setting, for its application of a practice theory inspired by 
Schatzki’s works, and for inspiring new research agendas especially in transitional economies 
and implications for practice. This study paves the way for research that moves beyond linear 
explanations of how performance measurement works and can be implemented. Successful 
achievement of the intended aims of performance measurement cannot be attributed to a 
rationally designed framework, but rather should be interpreted as an outcome of interactions 
and processes that engage individuals, organisations and tools. There may well be situations in 
which the teleoaffective structure of participants directs them to ends other than the intended 
aims. Second, we also see the positive impact of this study for managers who wish to bring 
about changes within the organisation. This study recommends the mobilisation of artefacts, 
such as various forms of bottom-up discussions, to encourage interactions between 
organisational members and influence individual beliefs and practical understandings of the 
intended managerial projects. 
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